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ECONOMIC CONTRADICTIONS
INTHE PROCESS OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Marion L. Piotrowski
Henderson State Teachers College
The process of the economic integration of the six coun-
:ries of Western Europe is probably one of the most outstand-
ing events of the post-war era. Aside from all the political im-
Dlications of this process, the economic aspect is of the utmost
mportance to the students of economics. International litera-
ure concerning this economic aspect exists in abundance. The
Drocess of Western European integration is particularly in-
teresting as an isolated phenomenon which started on a specific
day and attempts to continue to previously determined goals.
The international treaty signed March, 1957, in Rome set up
a permanent Economic Community composed of France, West
Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. We
shall consider the influence of some of the institutions created
jy this treaty particularly dealing with the integration of the
agricultural economies of the member countries; we shall not
dwell on their creation or structure since these aspects do not
specifically concern the present analysis.
The whole process of Western European integration is
due to the introduction of specific institutions and regulations.
3erhaps this confirms the arguments of the advocates of the in-
stitutional approach to the study of economic phenomena. 1 In
general, we agree with the assumption that the establishment
of the Common Market promoted and will continue to pro-
mote the economic growth of the member states. This generali-
zation, to our knowledge, is contested by some isolated voices. 2
'Arkansas Gazette. January 13, 1963. The economic editor of the Arkansas
Gazette, Mr. Leland Duvall, put it this way: "Right now, for example,
the part of American exports of farm products that goes to Western
Europe does not depend on the willingness of farmers to produce or sell,
or on their efficiency. The determining factor will be the decisions
reached in the European Economic Community. Only the government
of the United States can deal with the problems associated with the
Common Market area — which means that politics is at least as important
as production in this case."
Lamfalussy, "Europe Progress Due to Common Market," Lloyds
Bank Review, London (October, 1961). Lamfalussy argues that "there
seem to be no obvious figures which would point out a causal relation-
ship between the establishment of the Common Market and the rapid
growth of its members. It seems, in fact, quite possible to argue the
other way round and to suggest that it is the 'inherently' high rate of
growth of Continental Europe which made it possible to set up the
Common Market, not vice versa." We think this most pronounced opinion
should be taken cum grano salis as it can be considered a voice in the bit-
ter discussion between Great Britain and Common Market. 78
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'hese voices hold that there is no casual relationship between
le establishment of the Common Market and the subsequent
apid growth of the economies of the member countries. But
: will be difficult to deny that Western European Economic
Community, in the years following their organization of na-
ions, achieved great advances in Gross National Product and
n industrial production areas greater than those gained by the
Jnited States or the United Kingdom.3
The brilliant economic recovery of the Western European
konomic Community should not hide to attentive observers
wo major inherent economic contradictions. These contra-
ictions can hamper Western European development and can
make Western European economy in the long future more
ulnerable because subjected to internal inflationary pressure
nd accentuated dependence of external markets. What are these
ontradictions and what concrete consequences can they bring
o bear on European economy?
IFirst, there is an essential discrepancy between the liberaldustrial and financial policies of the Common Market ande regulatory character of the agricultural policy.4 The so-
I'ata
based on OECD statistics and the U. S. Survey of Current Business,
September, 1961, as compiled by the European Community Information
Service. "A New World Power," Brussels, Luxembourg; September,
1962. In the four years since the Common Market came into force, from
January 1958 to December 1961, the Community Gross National
Product rose by 21.5% against 11.6% in Great Britain and 10% in
the United States. Industrial production in the Community during the
four-year plan rose by approximately 29% compared with 13% in
Britain and just over 18% in the United States.
Iy liberal industrial policy we mean gradual release of industry, trade, andfinances from many regulations, with particular emphasis on the necessityof the healthy competition in internal and external markets. The firstCommunity's Anti Trust Law came into force on February 21, 1961.
(European Bulletin Number 53.)
The most important element of this "liberal" approach to industry is
tariff cuts in internal trade, the impact of which is so profound on the
economy of the member countries. This impact is very well sketched by
the Wall Street Journal's correspondent in France.
"Finally, by helping to form the Common Market just before Gen-
eral de Gaulle took office, France subjected its industry to stiff compe-
tition from goods coming in from other European nations under tariff
cuts the EEC brought about. An EEC study claims such competition
since 1958 has forced French factories to slash the price of a typical re-
frigerator from $160 to $100; a transistor radio from $50 to $20;
a set of kitchen kettles from $25 to $14. (The Wall Street Journal.
February 1, 1963.)
But the internal tariff cuts involve mostly industrial goods. "The
EEC treaty came into force on January 1, 1958. Today tariffs between
the member states have been reduced by 40% for industrial products,
35% for non-liberalized agricultural products, and 30% for the liberal-
ized agricultural products." (United Europe, Challenge and Opportun-
ity. Walter Hallstein. Harvard University Press (1962). Chapter II:
"The Economies of European Integration." p. 48.
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called Mansholt Plan covers European agriculture of the mem-
ber countries with protective shields. This Plan has involved
the Common Market in tariff disputes with outside nations al-
ready; but what is more important is the future effect of this
Plan on European industrial development. This regulation of
agriculture must result, ifnot in higher agricultural prices, any-
way in the stabilization of the existing prices which are far
above the international level. Higher agricultural prices must,
of necessity, result in higher industrial prices and create in-
flationary pressure which is already evident. 5
Sico Mansholt, a former Socialist Minister of Agriculture
of the Netherlands, now Vice Chairman of the EEC executive
body and head of the agricultural section, is the strong man
behind the scene in the field of the agricultural policy of the
EEC. The proposals embracing the whole series of measures
concerning the integration of European agriculture got their
name from him and are called, simply, "The Mansholt Plan."
The Mansholt Plan rigidly controls agricultural produc-
tion and marketing. This rigidity was criticized when the
Plan was presented inNovember, 1959; this rigidity was again
pointed out by many speakers of the European Assembly of the
EEC during the spring session of 1960. The Plan involves the
fixing of prices for major agricultural products; the creation of
an agricultural financial fund to finance the shaping of agri-
culture to fit the goals of the Plan; the creation of several
specialized marketing bureaus to supervise the marketing of
products such as wheat, grain, sugar, milk, etc. Should agri-
cultural production exceed consumption, the Plan offers means
for reducing production.
tWhen the Plan was presented to the European Assembly,ne of the members of the Assembly said, "This is more than'Malthusian' concept of policy; it is a 'Mansholtian' one."
The Plan has had one prime advantage from the very be-
ginning. Itis the only formulated and articulated Plan for the
=The Wall Street Journal in the dispatch of its Paris correspondent who is
writing on March 15, 1963: "Itis never the less equally true that France
does have an inflation problem —and it grows more serious. At the mo-
ment, France's competitive position within the Common Market does not
appear endangered. According to recent studies, labor costs in France are
currently rising more slowly than those in Germany, and only slightly
more than those in Italy and the Benelux countries. But the present
trend cannot be allowed to persist indefinitely without risk."
Itmeans that the inflationary pressure is evident in the economies of
all the member countries. 80
Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 17 [1963], Art. 15
Published by Arkansas Academy of Science, 1963
81
Economics and Western European Integration
organization and integration of agriculture within the Europe
of Six.*
I From the very beginning of the endeavors to create auropean Economic Community, it has been obvious that toave agriculture out of the process of economic integrationould be economically and politically impossible in view ofle great importance of the farming groups in each individualmntry as well as in the Community as a whole.7
I After
many discussions concerning the modalities and ap-
ication of the Mansholt Plan, The Council of Ministers of
ie Community—during the morning of January 14, 1962 —
ached an agreement on the first measures of common agricul-
ral policy. The official publication of the EEC commented
the following way on the agreement to agricultural integra-
Dn and its application. "Effective July 30, (1962) national
ntrols on import quotas, minimum price regulations, and
riffs on grains, eggs, poultry, and pork were replaced by
Dmmunity controls. Import levies are now applied by the
Dmmon Market to those products in both internal and ex-
rnal trade.
t"The levies, designed to prevent domestic producers froming undersold, bring prices of imported produce into line withe prices ruling in the particular national market. In order to
It the past there were in Europe many proposals and plans for the Euro-pean integration of agriculture. In 1950, during the negotiations of thetreaty establishing a European Coal and Steel Community, there wereendeavors to create the so-called Green Pool. Little came of it. Anyhow,there isn't trace of any challenging program to "Mansholt Plan" on thelines of American suggestions of the Conference for Economic Develop-ment "Toward a Realistic Farm Program." (Published in December,1957, in New York.)
Iccording to the Common Market Treaty of 1957, trade on agriculturalproducts was supposed to be subject to the same reductions on dutiesand quotas as apply to industrial goods. But the farmers in each membercountry of the Community formed a well organized political power.They were interested primarily in the defense of their immediate interests.Each member country had its own system of protecting the farmers andimproving their lot by artificial means. For these reasons, the agriculturalproblems in the Common Market have simply been ignored till spring,
1960. The protective barriers were maintained despite Rome Treaty pro-
visions—at first tacitly.
But the protests came from the exporters of farm products from Sicily
and Holland. Under the pressure exercised by the Dutch government in
the spring of 1960, the Rome Treaty provisions concerning the tariffs
cut for agricultural goods in internal trade were put in operation and
the decision was reached to start to work out the plan for the common
agricultural policy, the so-called Mansholt Plan.
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provide a measure of Community preference, they are lower
in the case of intra-Community trade than for external trade."*
We know already the reaction of "outsiders." United
States Secretary of Agriculture, Orville L. Freeman, at the
ministerial meeting of the Agricultural Committee of the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) in Paris on November 19, 1962, pointed out that
the Community's policy would profoundly affect the world
agricultural situation. He urged the Community to apply a
liberal trade policy in the field of agriculture.
The Mansholt Plan for setting up the whole system of
protection is much less flexible than the American pattern of
protective measures which can be revised at any time by Con-
gress. The Mansholt Plan is an essential part of the over-all
international set-up and willbe far more difficult to modify.
This Plan is more a political than an economic solution
for European Agriculture. The problems facing agricultural
production are similar in Europe to the problems facing the
American farmers —but not identical.
"The farm problem has its roots in the small-scale nature
of the farm firm, the technological revolution since 1920, the
relatively high birth-rate of farm people, and the declining
relative demand for farm products. Political measures to solve
the problem have only aggravated it, since they have disrupted
the normal interaction of economic forces and have dislocated
resources. The farm problem is an economic problem; it calls
for an economic not a political solution." (Principles of Eco-
nomics. Chapter 22, "The Farm Problem," by Professors O.
W. Cooley, E. E. Heimbach, and S. E. Warren.)
European agriculture is similar to American in the small-
scale type of farms, but the second problem is quite different
from the U.S.A. situation. The technological advances in Eu-
rope are not so pronounced —the prices are very high.
The third problem for both complexes, the high rate of
birth in the countryside could be even beneficial for European
economy, ifproperly handled.
As it was recently observed, it is not only the introduction
of modern machinery into agricultural production which is
detrimental to the small type farms in the U.S.A. but also the
marketing of agricultural products."
for the European Community. Number 56, (September, 1962),
Washington, D. C.
s"Processors need large supplies of raw products, therefore they may tend
to favor the large producer. The same can be said for the fresh market.
Large chains need large quantities of uniform products; therefore they
tend to buy from larger producers." Quoted from "Technological Ad-
vances Change Farm Marketing" by Ovid A. Martin of the Associated
Press. Arkansas Democrar. January 27, 1963.
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IThe Mansholt Plan does not
even pretend to solve the
ential problems: the distribution of land and the discrepancy
tween world and European agricultural prices. As an exam-
;, let us consider the problem of the price of wheat. Speaking
the Wesley an University on December 6, 1962, Professor
alter Hallstein, Common Market Commission President, de-
red: "What already exists is the framework, the instrument
r applying the policy, in other words, we have decided that
;re willbe a target price and intervention price for grain, that
;re willbe levies between the member states and at the ex-
nal frontier, that there will be certain financial measures,
le decision as to what is to be made of those instruments
willcome the moment we decide on the common grain price
—
¦
that is, the price which is to obtain for the whole Community
and toward which the still widely national prices must move."(United Europe. Challenge and Opportunity.) The first de-
cision on this price was to be determined by the Community's
Council ofMinisters by April1, 1963.
In January of this year, the world price for wheat was$64.40 a ton. In France, it was about $98.00 a ton: in West
Germany, almost double the world price at $126.00 a ton.
«ien the transition period for the establishment of the unifiedicultural market for Western Europe ends in 1970, a uni-
form price for wheat will be set up for all the six countries of
the European Community. Probably this price will be set at
the level between the French and German prices as these two
countries are the most important members of the Community.
With respect to wheat, Common Market countries face
this problem: where to peg the Common Market price.
France now has a price support level of about $2.30 a
bushel (as against the $1.82 price support in the U.S.A.):
Iest Germany supports wheat at $3.15 a bushel. The expec-:ion is that President de Gaulle will push for the higherest German price support to make France "Europe's Gran-f." (The Christian Science Monitor: Farm Export and EEC.arch 25, 1963.)
IThis example of wheat is indicative for other agriculturalxiucts. When, on July 30, 1962, the member countries sub-tted themselves to common farm tariffs, this resulted, fori most part, in increased European tariffs on wheat, feedlin, poultry, some pork products, wine, fruits, and vegetables.
K American press and opinion reacted particularly to the in-ase of import levies on poultry, one of the very importantus in American agricultural export to Western Europe.
t During the recent negotiations between Great Britain andmmon Market, the British press pointed out that unrestrict-
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ed, unconditional, and immediate acceptance by Great Britain
of the Mansholt Plan will—by 1970 —add more than 30 per
cent to the market price of wheat and flour in Great Britain.101
The Mansholt Plan must logically lead in the long run
to a general increase in food prices and produce a like effect on
industrial prices. We can compare the effect of the Mansholt
Plan to the effect of the Corn Laws in England in the 1820's
and 30's. This stabilization of agricultural prices on higher
levels willnot help to resolve the basic structural deficiency of
European agriculture which grows out of the distribution of
the land. The highly remunerative prices will only stabilize
the status quo and put the small submarginal holdings just on
the margin of cultivation."
The strongest negative impact of the Mansholt Plan, we
think, willbe felt on the market for industrial manpower;
existing policy in the field of agriculture is presently depriving
European industry of badly needed labor. The problem of con-
stantly available labor reserve for industry is of primary im-
portance for economic development. This was particularly ob-
vious in the German economic miracle which was brought
about by the sudden influx of almost eight million people from
East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. This influx pro-
vided West German industry with an available labor force
without which the German "Wirschaftswunder" could not
have been so spectacular.
The Mansholt Plan for Western European agriculture,
through stabilizing agricultural prices on a level far above the
world price level and making the small farm the going concern
through price protection—when it is no longer an economical-
ly going concern, will not only make the cost of living high
but also will influence adversely the normal process of the in-
flux of the rural population into growing industry thus
hampering the economic development. The European press for
some time has attracted the attention of the public to the prob-
«o"British Agriculture to Face Shake-up under Trade Plan." A.P. dispatch
from London. Arkansas Democrat. January 6, 1963.
"The distribution of land in Europe is characterized by small holdings due
to shortage of land. In acres, the surface area at the disposition of the
farmer is as follows: Germany, 8; Belgium, 12.5; France, 16.7; Italy,
8.1; Luxembourg, 10; Holland, 10.5. (Quoted from L'Agriculture et lc
Marche Commun par Francois Henri de Virieu Le Monde Diplomatique.
Paris, November, 1959.)
In the U.S.A., about 22 million people or 12 per cent of the entire
population live from agriculture. They till about 5 million farms em-
bracing more than one billion acres of land. It means that the average
surface is 50 acres per farmer; but through purchases and renting many
farmers have been steadily increasing the size of their farms. Thus, the
average size of the American farm is now 233 acres. (Principles of Eco-
nomics; "The Farm Problem.")
84
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In of the labor shortage. The data presented by the officialblication of the EEC, Bulletin for Europe, Number 57,tober and November of 1962, are most significant. 12
KThe high prices on agricultural goods together with theor shortages should inevitably create permanent inflationary
pressure, the phenomenon which is already worrying the men
responsible for the European economy. "United States tourists
Ive noticed this and wondered whether it is only the outsiderio is being charged more. But any tourist who takes thene to stroll through side streets off the tourist route, or toiit small towns where sightseers seldom go, finds that the
natives too, are getting a dose of inflation, which invariably
affects the ability to compete on the export-import trade. Some
of this has not yet shown up on statistics, but firsthand ob-
servation has uncovered startling increases that will figure in
government reports by mid 1963." 13
Now we shall consider the problem of private expenditure.
In November, 1962, EEC released the report of the Special
«mmittee of Economic Experts involving the economic fore-t for the future. The report presents growth estimates of
the major components of the economies of the six countries and
of the Community as a whole projected over the decade 1960-
1970. According to these estimates, the gross product of the
Community will increase by 53-59 per cent from 1960 to
1970; in dollars that increase is from $189 billion to $277
«2* 'Germany. Although the working population increased by 2.4 per cent
during 1961, demand for labor rose even faster; and record of 600,000
vacancies were registered. It was estimated that Germany would need an
additional force of 171,000 workers during 1962 if the anticipated rise
in industrial production was to be achieved.
"Netherlands. Labor reserves are almost exhausted. Some improve-
ment is expected to show this fall, and the employment of women work-
ers
—
so far the lowest in the Community —is expected to increase.
"Luxembourg. The proportion of foreign workers employed in Lux-
embourg, which now accounts for nearly a third of the total labor force,
increased by only one per cent in 1961.
"France. General labor shortages persist in the north, the northeast,
and the Paris region. The total French working population continues to
ncrease, mainly as the result of immigration. In 1962 almost 79,000
workers were added to the labor force from this source compared with
49,000 in 1960 Of the immigrants, nearly 24,000 came from
taly and over 39,000 from Spain. A further easing of the labor market
n France can be expected from the influx of Algerian refugees and re-
ductions in military manpower. On the other hand, reductions in the
working week are now likely.
"Belgium. Despite slowing of economic expansion in 1961, unfilled
cancies rose by 60 percent.
t "Italy. A surplus of labor still exists, although the remarkable strideshich the economy has made in recent years have steadily reduced un-iployment."
'sNation's Business. March, 1963. p. 44.
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billion. The Commission expects that personal expenditures
will increase by 61-67 per cent as compared with 53-59 per
cent for Gross National Product; this means a possible increase
from $110 billion to $188 billion. (Bulletin from the Com-
munity. Number 59.) According to this expectation, the pri-
vate expenditure willrise faster than the rise of the GNP but
certainly does not indicate that the pattern of European con-
sumption will change radically. Not at all! We must take into
consideration that European private expenditure after the Sec-
ond World War started from a very low level and is far be-
hind the consumption in the United States of America. Par-
ticularly is this true in the field of nondurable consumer goods.
Some data 14 on 1956 European and American private expen-
ditures for consumer goods willpermit enlightening compari-
son.15 The consumption of such items as meat, eggs, butter,
milk, steel, and energy per capita is much lower in EEC than
in the U.S.A. Just to say that in West Germany consumption
of meat is 41.6 klg. per capita—in the U.S.A., 82.6 klg.; we
say with a great deal of adequacy that American consumption
of the above mentioned items (meat, eggs, butter, milk, steel,
energy) is double the European.
The anticipated increase in personal expenditure of 61-
67 per cent between 1960 and 70 willnot greatly vary the
pattern of European consumption because this rise must be
directly related to the predicted increase in European popula-
tion. This population increase is expected to reach 8 per cent
or 168 to 175 million. We can assume that the average pro-
pensity to consume in the EEC Community willbe relatively
stable.
The consumption of the EEC countries is—and willbe
—handicapped by the very high prices which the consumer in
the Common Market must pay for the food. Just to show this
more clearly, let us say it in this way: to pay for 1 klg. ofjeef sirloin, the American worker must spend 68 minutes of
work; French, 317; Belgian, 256; German, 137; and Italian,
353. To buy one klg. of flour, the American worker must
f*EECC statistique de base, produits alimentaire moyenne 1953-56, acieret energie 1956. Economic et Politique. Special Issue.
per capita in klg.
Meat Eggs Butter Milk Steel Energy
Germany 41.6 9.7 5.7 128 417 3,600
France 74.6 11.0 5.6 88.6 276 2,860
Italy 19.4 7.4 1.2 52.3 120 1,120
Belgium 49.3 13.9 9.4 91.6 296 4,340
Luxembourg
Netherlands 37.5 7.6 2.6 199.9 237 2,450
EEC 45.4 9.5 4.3 97.4 276 2,680
USA 82.6 21.8 3.2 158 600 8.580
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Knd 6 minutes; Belgian, 38; French, 33; German, 19; andlian, 34. A similar gap exists in the case of milk, eggs, and
fruits.16
What we must conclude is that the European plan of ag-
ricultural integration will result in the petrification of highly
artificial level of agricultural prices which in the long run must
Ifluence
industrial prices. 17 The Mansholt Plan will deprive
dustry of the necessary influx of man power from the rural
eas. This dislocation of resources due to the excessive pro-
:tion will stabilize European propensity to consume. Par-
:ularly since European consumption is dictated by customs, a
>werful stimulus is needed in the drastic lowering of food
ices. The reportages on the spectacular rise in European per-
nal expenditures are misleading. For the most part, these
portages are based on mistaken external signs. The so-called
mericanization of European consumption involves the ac-
ptance of modern American procedure but not prices.
IBecause of the limitation of the internal market the Euro-an industry will traditionally look for the foreign marketsr their industrial products. The accumulated surplusses willinvested abroad following the traditional pattern of theiropean economic expansion in 19th century and in the be-ming of the 20th century.
¦"International Labor Office, United Nations: The Economic Almanac 1962.
I[he Common Market, taken all round, provides 87 per cent of its agri-cultural requirements. With the exception of coarse grain, citrous fruits,fats (except butter) and oils, the Common Market area is self-supportingor more. Quoted from Common Market Commission's proposals for acommon agricultural policy presented to the Economic and Social Com-mittee of the EEC on November 7, 1959.
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